Federal Court Diversity Jurisdiction and the Corporation by Jackson, David W.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 8 Issue 1 
Spring 1972 
Federal Court Diversity Jurisdiction and the Corporation 
David W. Jackson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David W. Jackson, Federal Court Diversity Jurisdiction and the Corporation, 8 Tulsa L. J. 120 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol8/iss1/7 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
FEDERAL COURT DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
AND THE CORPORATION
One of the most provocative areas of constitutional de-
velopment in this country has stemmed from the efforts of
the corporation to gain for the persona ficta the same bene-
fits and rights as those accorded natural citizens. One facet
of this epic turns round the corporate "right"' to sue and be
sued in federal courts as a citizen as that term is used in the
diversity statute.2
Today, with exceptions to be discussed below, the cor-
poration may gain access to the federal court provided it
qualifies as a citizen of a different state or an alien. It is the
purpose of this article to trace the birth and maturation of
this procedural concept and consider aspects which remain
unsettled. Against this background the arguments for and
against retention of corporate diversity standing will be ana-
lysed in order to provide new insights into the controversy.
When the first Judiciary Act was passed in 17893 the
private corporation was virtually unknown. Prior to 1790 only
30 private corporations had been chartered in the thirteen
states.4 It was not until 1809 that the question of corporate
diversity status arose. In that year in the famous case of Bank
of the United States v. Deveaux5 Chief Justice Marshall de-
clared that the corporation was an "invisible, intangible, and
artificial being, [a]mere legal entity, [which] is certainly not
a citizen. .". ." Marshall went on to rule that the citizenship
See generally G. I-HDESON, THE PosrrmoN OF FOREIGN CoR-
PORATiONS IN A_=mcA CONsnTuTIONAL LAW (1918).
2 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1964).
3 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
4 C. Warren, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship, 19
VA. L. REV. 661, 662 (1933).
Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 194
(1809).
Id. at 196.
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CORPORATE DIVERSITY
of the officers and the shareholders must prevail and since
these parties were alleged to be citizens of Pennsylvania the
action against a Georgia citizen was maintained under the
diversity provision even though the Chief Justice knew the
allegation was a pure fiction since a majority of the plaintiff's
shareholders were British subjects." By indulging in this fic-
tion, as will be seen later, Marshall provided the basis for
the construction of another fiction of a much expanded dimen-
sion.
Corporations, in suits following Deveaux, strenuously
argued against their "right" to be treated as citizens for diver-
sity purposes. The basis of this protest lay in the fact that it
was not until the Supreme Court upheld the validity of state
requirements, in 1870 and 1878, that a corporation doing busi-
ness in the state consent to have itself "found" through
service of process on a state official for the purpose of sub-
jecting the foreign corporation to suit in that state.8 By com-
bining the rule of the Deveaust case with the complete diver-
sity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss9 a corporation
could defeat diversity jurisdiction in almost every instance
since it had merely to allege that one of its shareholders was
a citizen of the plaintiff's state.10
However, in 1844 the Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charles-
ton Railroad Company, a Tennessee corporation, placed the
last straw on the camel's back by alleging that one of its
shareholders was a Charleston bank which in turn had a New
York shareholder (the plaintiff's state of residence)." Justice
Wayne speaking for the Court declared that a corporation
chartered by a state is "entitled, for the purpose of suing and
7 C. Warren, supra note 4, at 665-66.
8 Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Harris, 79 U.S. (12 Wallace) 65 (1870);
Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1878).
9 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
10 C. Warren, supra note 4, at 670.
1 Louisville, C.&C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
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being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that State."12 In another
part of the opinion the Justice commented that the decisions
in the Strawbridge and Deveaux cases had never been satis-
factory to the bar and not entirely satisfactory to the Court
that had made them; that later courts had followed Deveaux
not because it was right but because it had been made.13
In 1853 the Court gave the appearance of retreating from
Letson by returning to the Marshall position that the corpora-
tion (for diversity purposes) was certainly not a citizen, but
then went on. to create the fiction that for diversity purposes
a conclusive presumption existed that all the shareholders
of the corporation were citizens of the state of incorporation.
14
As a conceptual notion the rule laid down in that decision
remains, with exceptions to be noted later, the basic law today.
Of this rule Justice Shiras was to say in 1896:
To fully reconcile all the expressions used in these
cases would be no easy task, but we think the follow-
ing propositions may be fairly deduced from them:
[t]here is an indisputable legal presumption that a
state corporation, when sued or suing in a Circuit
Court of the United States, is composed of citizens
of the State which created it, and hence such a cor-
poration is itself deemed to come within that provision
of the Constitution of the United States which con-
fers jurisdiction upon the Federal courts in 'contro-
versies between citizens of different States. " r
The years following the sanction of state court jurisdic-
tfon over the foreign corporation produced a swing in cor-
porate preference. The chartering state forum (arguably con-
trolled by the corporation) had been lost and the federal courts
appeared to be preferable to the foreign state court. This
juxtaposition was stimulated by the industrialization of the
late 19th Century and the accompanying increase in industrial
12 Id. at 555.
Is Id. at 556.
14 Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
15 St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 562 (1896).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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injuries, particularly among railroad employees. The typical
suit by a railway worker began in the state court of the em-
ployee's domicile. At that point the railway would seek re-
moval to the federal circuit court, alleging diversity of citizen-
ship. This procedure involved additional time, expense and
usually travel for both parties, but the railway, being in a
better position to bear such incidents, was often able to use
them as leverage to exact a token settlement from the acci-
dent victim.
The widespread employment of such tactics spawned a
movement in Congress to deny corporations the diversity
avenue to the federal courts. From 1880 through 1910 a bill
was frequently before the House which essentially proposed
to divest the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear any case
involving a corporation upon diversity grounds if such cor-
poration was doing business within that state. In that thirty
year period the measure was passed by the House seven times,
but was consistently rejected by the Senate.18
In 1928 and 1930 Senator George Norris proposed radical
curtailment of jurisdiction of the federal circuit courts. 17 The
Norris bills went too far for serious Congressional considera-
tion, but the interest generated by their consideration led,
in 1931, to the introduction of the Attorney General's Bill
which, in effect, would have provided for the same jurisdic-
tional retraction as the earlier proposals.1 8 Although the bill
met defeat, the debate over it provided an interesting picture
of how firmly entrenched the fiction of the Letson decision
had become with the bar. One commentator has noted that
the fictitious heritage of the corporate right was hardly men-
tioned, but that:
. . . these lawyers told the committees that the Su-
10 C. Warren, supra note 4, at 681.
17 S. 3151, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928); S. 4357, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1930).
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preme Court holds that corporations are citizens of
the states that incorporate them. The representative
of the American Bar Association coupled this with
an assertion that it was mandatory upon Congress
to confer upon the federal courts jurisdiction of 'Con-
troversies . . . between Citizens of different States,'
that Congress having conferred it could not withdraw
or curtail it, and that corporations being citizens,
Congress could not deny them their constitutional
right to this jurisdiction.19
Despite the failure of the Norris and the Attorney Gen-
eral's measures, pressure continued for the contraction or
withdrawal of federal jurisdiction from the corporate litigant.
Finally, in 1958 this movement resulted in legislative amend-
ment of the diversity statute.20 The change was prompted by
debate which pointed out that:
This fiction of stamping a corporation a citizen of
the State of its incorporation has given rise to the evil
whereby a local institution . . . is enabled to bring
its litigation into the Federal courts simply because
it has obtained a corporate charter from another
State.21
The report went on to state that such abuse did nothing to
fulfill the avowed purpose of diversity jurisdiction, i.e., to
prevent local prejudice against outsiders.22
Under the terms of § 1332(c) the corporation is to be
treated, for diversity purposes, as a citizen of the state of its
incorporation and of the state of its principal place of busi-
ness. The apparent legislative intent of § 1332(c) was to pre-
vent a corporation,
• . . which, though chartered in another state, is in
every meaningful respect a local institution, from
19 McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction: III, 56 HAxv. L. REv.
1225, 1234 (1943).
20 28 U.S.C. §1332(c) (1964).
21 S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
22 Id.
[Vol. 8, No. 1
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bringing controversies with local citizens into the fed-
eral courts.2
Logically the bulk of litigation involving a corporation would
arise in the state where it carries on the bulk of its activities;
and hence, by denying the corporation the diversity "out" in
that state, it was thought that the dual purposes of federal
jurisdictional contraction and practical justice would be
achieved.2 4
It might have been expected that the passage of § 1332(c)
would have laid to rest the controversy stirred up by the cor-
poration as a litigant in federal court, but the promise of that
amendment was not fulfilled in the decade-plus after its
enactment. Two pressing questions still remain unanswered:
(1) what legal standard should be applied to determine the
corporation's "principal place of business"; and (2) possibly
more critical in the long run, does § 1332 (c) go far enough?
Or, in other words, should the federal courts be closed en-
tirely to the corporate litigant?
The phrase "principal place of business" was drawn from
the Bankruptcy Act 25 with the assumption that it would be
interpreted according to judicial experience under that Act.
Unfortunately, however, the construction experience under
the bankruptcy provision tended to do little more than muddle
the already confused situation, since about the only discerni-
ble principle that had been announced in the bankruptcy law
was that the principal place of business was a question of
fact to be determined in light of all relevant evidence.2 6
23 Moore and Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizen-
ship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77
HARv. L. REV. 1426, 1444 (1964).
24 Id. at 1444.
21 11 U.S.C. §11(a) (1) (1964).
23 See, e.g., Carolina Motor Express Lines, Inc. v. Blue & White
Serv., Inc. 192 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1951); Bank of Commerce
v. Carter, 61 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1932).
1972]
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The courts, thus left to their own devices, attempted in
various ways to adapt the rather slippery standard of the
statute with its declared purposes: reduction of the federal
dockets, and amelioration of the rather anomalous situation
whereby the foreign corporation was given a choice of forum
merely because of the fortuitous fact that it happened to be
chartered in another state.
Two prevailing tests emerged from this effort. Under the
first the courts attempted to identify the state where the cor-
poration carried on the bulk of its corporate activity and to
designate that state as the place where the corporation carried
on its principal business 27 This standard obviously fulfilled
the congressional purpose of limiting access to federal court
since the state where a corporation carries on its primary
activities would be expected to be the state where it would
most often be involved in litigation. The test, however, be-
came a. guessing game with different courts applying their
own arbitrary criteria and placing varying emphasis on com-
monly applied denominators. 28 Indeed, an overdrawn consid-
eration of activities determinative of the corporation's princi-
pal place of business could work to defeat the avowed docket
elearing purpose of the amendment.29
Other courts developed the so-called "nerve center" or
"home office" test under which the place of business was de-
clared to be where the executive, personnel, advertising, pub-
lic relations and other policy making departments were lo-
cated.30 Naturally the home office test had a certain amount
27 Inland Rubber Corp. v. Triple A Tire Serv., Inc., 220 F.
Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Anniston Soil Pipe Co. v. Cen-
tral Foundry Co., 216 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ala. 1963), aff'd
per curiam, 329 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1964).
28 See generally Note, 6 UTAH L. REV. 231 (1958).
29 See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 95, where eight years
were spent determining the matter of jurisdiction.
30 See, e.g., Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp. 170 F.
Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
126 [Vol. 8, No. I
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of appeal in that it was simple to determine, apply and also
would seem to answer the legislative mandate, where, as is
common, the bulk of the corporate affairs are conducted in
the state of the home office. However, its application in other
circumstances might tend to preserve rather than cure the
anomaly of the local institution gaining access to the federal
courts because the main office (as previously the charter of
incorporation) happened to be located in another state.
To resolve the inconsistency of the home office and the
place of operations tests some writers have proposed that the
courts should employ the place of operations standard where
one state quite obviously can be pointed to as the principal
place of business, and to resort to the home office test only
where no one state answers the requirement as the primary
place of operations. 1 Perhaps such an approach is necessary
in order to render § 1332 (c) useful in the case where a
limiting device is really needed-in the case of a giant far
flung enterprise-but it is in such a case that the defects
of the amendment are most apparent. As Judge Goodrich
noted in Kelly v. United States Steel Corp:32
The concept may get artificial in some cases as indeed
it is in the case before us. This great corporation has
fourteen divisions of the parent corporation and eleven
principal subordinate companies. Its various manufac-
turing activities are spread over practically all the
United States and extend to foreign countries. It has
literally dozens of important places of business one of
which we must pick out as the principal one because
the statute says so (footnotes omitted).83
In 1964 Congress responded to a peculiar Louisiana
Statute34 which permitted an injured party to sue an out-of-
state insurer without joinder of the insured. The net effect
81 C. WhiGHT, HAzmBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 9i
(2d ed. 1970).
32 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960).
33 Id. at 853.
34 LA. REV. STAT. tit. 22, §655 (West 1959).
19721
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of the law was to permit plaintiffs' attorneys to seek and re-
ceive federal jurisdiction via diversity and thereby avoid a
quirk of local Louisiana law-the rather liberal appellate pro-
visions for review of jury determinations. Under the 1964
amendment the injured party may sue the insurer in federal
court only if he would have been able to sue with the insured
party joined.35 As was the case with the 1958 change, the 1964
revision served only to correct a glaring abuse of corporate
access to the federal system through the door of diversity.
. Another congressional action designed to curtail federal
litigation generally has been that of increasing the jurisdic-
tional amount from time to time,3 6 which, it should be assum-
ed, would on balance favor the corporate litigant if it be
granted that suits involving corporations will involve a higher
sum than the average litigation between individuals.
Apart from this congressional activity, but complemen-
tary to it, several Supreme Court decisions have played an
important function in limiting the diversity jurisdiction of
the district courts. For purposes of this article one in parti-
cular is significant. In the case of United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc.3 7 the Court was
asked to extend the purview of diversity jurisdiction to un-
incorporated associations, i.e., labor unions. Speaking for the
Court Justice Fortas remarked favorably on the realistic
similarity between corporations and the unincorporated as-
sociation, but declined to grant the extension by rather sum-
marily directing the association to make its arguments to Con-
gress.38 Later in the opinion, almost apologetically, Justice
Fortas noted possible problems in determining the state of
, 28 U.S.C. §1332 (c) (1964).
86 The Judiciary Act of. 1789 fixed this sum at $500. It was
raised to $2,000 in 1887; $3,000 in 1911 and to the present
$10,000 figure in 1958.
87 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
38 Id. at 150-51.
[Vol. 8, No. I
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citizenship of these organizations,39 a dialogue reminiscent of
that used by Chief Justice Marshall.40 The significance of the
Bouligny decision rests, however, in the refusal of the Court
to push out the borders of diversity coverage although no
fundamental substantive differences between the entities ex-
isted, and that the union argued, albeit unsuccessfully, for
diversity extension not so much to protect it from local preju-
dice because of being an outsider, but because of its inherent
characteristics.
Having reviewed what has been done to reduce the inci-
dence of corporate presence in federal litigation the chief
proposal for additional limitation should be considered. The
American Law Institute has proposed that for diversity pur-
poses a corporation should be deemed a citizen of every state
in which it is incorporated;4' this to eliminate the curious
situation by which a party plaintiff may sue a corporation,
which is incorporated in several states, in any state where it
is so incorporated except the state of the plaintiff's domicile.42
Of more significance however, the Institute has recommend-
ed that no corporation shall be permitted to utilize the federal
courts either originally or through the removal process in any
state where it has maintained a local office for more than two
years and the action arises out of the activities of that local
establishment.43 It is obvious that the enactment of this pro-
vision would tend to lessen the availability of federal courts
to the corporation and to that extent do away with the pre-
vailing dichotomy created by that availability, but at the price
of the distinction presented by the two year proviso between
39 Id. at 152.
40 Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 194
(1809).
41 ALI STUDY OF THE DmsION OF JuRIsDICTIoN BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS §1301(b) (2) (1969).
42 See, e.g., Hudak v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.,
238 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
13 ALI STUDY OF THE DmSION OF JURIsDIcTIoN BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL CouRTs §1302(b) (1969).
1972]
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the established corporation and the new or expanding cor-
poration. The commentary stresses that this distinction is em-
ployed to reduce the likelihood of prejudice (since a corpora-
tion doing business in a state for twd years should be consid-
ered by jurors as a local institution), but still this distinction
would seem to have little realistic substance and to be more
of a crude rule of thumb.
Furthermore, the application of the proposal would ap-
pear to be frought with possibilities for delay and confusion,
not unlike that attending the application of the 1958 diversity
amendment, e.g., should non-consecutive periods of business
be tacked together and what exactly constitutes an action
arising out of contact with a local establishment. The follow-
ing example is inserted to illustrate just a few thorns which
might rise up to pierce the logical gloss of the American Law
Institute proposal: Corporation X has engaged in activities in
State A for over two years which may be within the purview
of the "local establishment" concept as that concept is defined
in the proposal.4 4 Plaintiff has contracted with X through its
local office but the final approval of the contract is made at
the home office in State B. Assuming the home office ap-
proved the contract to provide Plaintiff with a particular item
that was shipped directly to the Plaintiff from State C and
that, through negligence of X in manufacturing in State D,
injures the Plaintiff upon use in State A, has t h e cor-
poration a good case for removal in State A, or is such re-
moval bound by application of the provision? At first glance
this situation may appear to be far fetched but in the ultra-
complex modern business community such an occurrence
would be far from impossible. So then, § 1302(b) would ap-.
pear to invite protected threshold jurisdictional factual con-
siderations over whether or not the corporation had carried
on the activities of a local establishment; whether these acti-
vities had been carried on for more than two years; and finally,
whether the action had arisen out of contact with that local
44 Id.
(Vol. 8, No. I
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establishment. Such troublesome questions would of course
add to the overcrowded federal docket; but of more import-
ance, it is proposed that jurisdictional status should be definite,
predictable and not, as has been the case with § 1332(c), sub-
ject to a variety of judicial interpretations.
. Indeed, in the opinion of this writer the inescapable weak-
nesses of the 1958 change to §1332 (c) and the American Law
Institute proposals are that they seek to reconcile the logical in-
consistencies of the fictitious right of the fictitious multistate
corporate being to be accorded a federal hearing via diversity.
It is submitted that nothing short of a complete and fresh re-
appraisal of the nature of the corporation must be undertaken.
Once this reappraisal has been completed it will become ob-
vious that the Letson rule, certainly a quirk in constitutional
circles, was also a practical mistake which must now be cor-
rected to eliminate the absurdity of the corporate diversity
anomaly and, incidentally, to end the confusion which has at-
tended the congressional and judicial efforts to perpetuate
that anomaly while yet confining it to the Letson model.
Initially it is apparent that the corporation is endowed as
an entity with many characteristics peculiar to that type of
organization. For the purposes of this discussion the limited
liability attribute is significant since it is generally acknowl-
edged that this characteristic permitted the corporation, as
such, to acquire large venture capital accumulations. Speaking
in -terms of public policy it could be stated that the govern-
ment permitted the capital contributors, for liability purposes,
to remain personally exempt except as to the extent of the
contribution actually made. In turn, by holding and using
capital accumulations theretofore unobtainable, the corpora-
tion assumed an ability to expand its activities to many states
and to assume a position of dominance as toward private par-
ties and perhaps toward legislatures, judges and juries. Wheth-
er judicial concessions were accorded the corporation because
of this influence or merely because the corporation gained
a sympathetic ear from a judiciary sensitive to the corporate
form as necessary to American economic expansion, the fact
1972]
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 8 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol8/iss1/7
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
remains, as the reports leading up to the passage of the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act 45 illustrate, that concentrated economic
power tended to beget political influence which in turn was
used to protect and broaden this economic power. Thus it is
easy to see why the corporation was able to gain the advantage
of a choice of forum when in fact no similarity existed be-
tween the natural citizen, whose state citizenship was de-
termined by domicile requirements and a corporation whose
citizenship prior to 1958 was determined solely by looking to
the state where it had been incorporated and where it con-
ceivably had no other connection.
Four points are immediately apparent from this first ex-
amination of the corporate form. First, the corporation's typi-
cally strong capital position permits it the leisure of delayed
and expensive law suits. Second, this delay and expense often
works to the corporation's comparative advantage since it has,
vis-a-vis the individual litigant, greater staying power and
thus may utilize the threat of a long, drawn-out suit to force
the individual into a settlement on the corporation's own
terms. Next, it would appear that if there must be a choice
made as to who should bear the burden for the multi-state
nature of the corporation it should not be borne by the indi-
vidual citizen but by the corporation which has benefited by
a unique governmental treatment enabling it to expand into
many different states. To permit otherwise allows it, having
taken advantage of its favored position to become for all prac-
tical purposes a citizen of several states, to escape the logical
implications of that favored treatment. Finally, it may be
speculated that the power acquired through capital accumu-
lation may have played a role in gaining for the corporation
its status as a citizen for diversity purposes. Certainly the
limited liability device was intended by the state to promote
economic development; it is questionable that it was intended
to create a vested judicial interest for the corporation.
45 15 U.S.C. §1 (1964).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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Apart from the primary characteristic of the corporation,
the fact remains that the courts of the federal sector are over-
worked4 6 and that this staggering case load is not in the public
interest since justice long delayed is justice denied. This
result will tend to lessen the general public confidence in and
respect for the judiciary, and may in the final analysis end
recourse to the courts as an acceptable method for the settle-
ment of disputes. Certainly, local prejudice at the state level
would seem to work toward the same end but it is submitted
that this defect is preferable to an overcrowded federal court
system since it is confined historically to certain states and its
manifestation is speculative whereas the clogged federal dis-
trict court docket works to the detriment of all those who seek
its hearing.
Recognizing the need for a federal court limiting device
several possibilities might be considered. The jurisdictional
amount might be hiked, but this change, it would seem, would
be undesirable since it would further remove the individual
litigant from federal forum (particularly where a federal
question is involved) and serve to make the federal court an
exclusive club where only "high priced" litigation is taken.
On the other hand, the federal question area itself could
be re-examined to require state hearings in all but suits in-
volving sensitive constitutional rights. This solution, however,
would necessarily subject federal and constitutional provisions
to a variety of state court interpretations; an area of law
which, if it is to be most effective, should be interpreted so
as to afford uniform treatment to all citizens regardless of
where they happen to live.47 For this and other reasons no
40 Between 1960 and 1965 the backlog of cases in district courts
grew from 61,251 to 74,395. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES AND
ANNUAL REPORT OF = DIRECTOR OF THE AmmNSTRATV
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1965).
4T This principle has been recognized by the Supreme Court
where a matter of pressing national concern is at stake;
see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
1972]
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serious moves have been made to curtail the federal question
basis for federal jurisdiction and recent years have witnessed
a proliferation of federal laws upon which jurisdiction may be
predicated.48
Another candidate for reduction of the case load at the
federal level is diversity jurisdiction itself,49 it being accepted
that the constitutional provision providing for diversity juris-
diction is permissive only and not mandatory on Congress and
hence that such an abrogation could be effected.50 This argu-
ment strikes an appealing chord especially when considered
in conjunction with the permissive attitude of the Supreme
Court as to what defendant contact with plaintiff's state may
subject it to the jurisdiction of that state,"1 and with the be-
lievable theory advanced by Frankfurter that the original
justification for diversity jurisdiction, i.e., as a preventive
against local prejudice, whatever its merit in 1789, has been
eroded by the cosmopolitan attitude which the mobile life
style of current times has engendered.52 However, numerous
situations can be conjured up in which the jurisdiction must
lie in a state far removed from the plaintiff's home and neces-
sarily subject him to inordinate expense and inconvenience to
pursue his rights. The clearest example of this situation is
presented by the case of the citizen of State A who is injured
while on a trip to State B. This argument-maintenance of
diversity jurisdiction for individuals - has little validity when
applied to the corporate being, however. Certainly, it may be
48 A prime example of this upsweep can be seen in the num-
ber of cases which were spawned by the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 §1065, 15 U.S.C. §78a (1964).
49 The classic work supporting this view is Frankfurter, Dis-
tribution of Judicial Power Between United States and
State Courts, 13 ComuEm. L.Q. 499 (1928).
50 U.S. CowsTr. art. I1, §2 provides only for the original juris-
diction of the Supreme Court. All other federal jurisdic-
tion is brought into being through congressional action.
5 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
52 Frankfurter, supra note 49 at 521.
[Vol. 8, No. I
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that under some fact situations the corporation may subject
itself to liability in states where it is not doing business (hence
where there is no citizenship equivilancy); for example,
through a state's non-resident motorist statute. But, the in-
herent unfairness of forcing a non-resident individual plaintiff
into litigation in a distant state which mitigates against a
general absolution of diversity jurisdiction is simply not as
evident when tested against a fact situation involving a foreign
corporate defendant, i.e., if a type of litigant must be penalized
by limiting diversity jurisdiction, the corporate type is in a
better position to bear it.
That the removal of the corporation from the federal court
as a diverse citizen would effect a significant reduction in the
federal district court caseload can be seen by reference to the
1964 statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts which indicated that in that year a non-
resident corporation was involved in 11.3% of all original di-
versity actions and in nearly 60% of all removal diversity
cases, or 3,865 cases out of a total of 20,074 diversity actions.53
As has been noted earlier there may be some instances
where corporate litigants (particularly corporate defendants)
are indeed subject to prejudice. It is possible the fact that
the corporation is a foreign organization may be one factor
which induces prejudice although it is probable that if it does
it operates in conjunction with other factors such as the cor-
poration's size, wealth and practices and in all likelihood
plays an insignificant role when compared to them. Indeed,
a case can be made for the point that diversity jurisdiction
has encouraged the tolerance of prejudice in state courts in
local actions by making such prejudice palatable because of
its small scale. Should corporations, which play a key role in
a state's economic picture, be subjected to intolerable local
prejudice, it is to be assumed that they would take action
52 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UJNITED STATES COURTS (1964).
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to avoid that prejudice, i.e., by relocating which in turn should
force the state to deal with the prejudice problem as an alter-
native to losing the economic stimulation of corporate busi-
ness. As matters now stand a foreign corporation doing busi-
ness in Louisiana can depend upon the federal courts as a
forum; whereas, should the right to that forum be lost the
corporation must either accept local prejudice as exerted
through local courts or cease business (and obviously employ-
ment and capital expenditures) in the state. Hopefully a mass
exodus of business from a state would encourage reform meas-
ures to minimize the cause of the exodus and grant relief to
those injured by it.
Closely related to the last point is the argument that local
prejudice is, or should be, simply one factor among many up-
on which the corporate leadership predicates a decision to do
business. To elaborate, when the XYZ Corporation contem-
plates an expansion into Mississippi, various factors must be
considered to determine the feasibility of the move including
labor availability and costs, taxes, and market demand to men-
tion just a few. Certainly the expected fairness or hostility
of the Mississippi juries and judges could just as easily be
considered as simply another anticipated business expense.
Here again, states bidding for corporate entry should be ex-
pected to take steps to eliminate practices which would dam-
age their position in this campaign.
It is submitted that the original reason for diversity juris-
diction is no longer valid and that the justification for ac-
cording such jurisdiction to the corporate litigant has no basis
either in terms of constitutional imperative or practical ne-
cessity.
If it is time to further limit access to the federal courts,
a schedule of priorities should be programmed to withdraw
that access first from those least entitled to it. As has been
shown the concept of the corporation as a citizen for diversity
purposes has little to recommend it either from a constitu-
tional or logical view point and attempts to preserve the Letson
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fiction have been more notable for the confusion which they
have created than for their success in eliminating the di-
chotomy of the multi-state corporation as a diverse citizen.
It is recommended that Congress act to end this dichotomy
by enacting an amendment to the diversity provision which
will declare simply that for diversity purposes a corporation
shall not be deemed to be a state citizen.
In fairness to corporations who would not have entered
into business in particular jurisdictions under such a change,
I would provide for a waiting period prior to the amendment's
effective date to allow such corporations to cease operations
in those states; or alternatively, to permit those states to work
to remove fears of prejudice.
Finally, I would provide that at any time in a state pro-
ceeding involving a corporate litigant not doing business in
that state the corporation may petition the appropriate fed-
eral district court to remove the case on the grounds of prov-
able prejudice by the state judicial officials and to permit the
district court to assume jurisdiction for prejudice shown. Such
provisions would provide the corporation with protection
against provable prejudice in the state court, would lighten
the caseload in the federal district court and correct at last
the Letson error, an error born of, at best, mistake, preserved
by misunderstanding and legitimated by toleration; a tolera-
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